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THE DISSENT IN THE TANEY COURT
BY PAUL DOLAN*
Few subjects in American legal history have had such continued atten-
tion of scholars as that of the role played by the Supreme Court of the United
States under the chief-justiceship of Roger Brooke Taney in the fateful
quarter-century preceding the Civil War. Foremost among these writers has
been Dr, Carl Brent Swisher of the Johns Hopkins University who is the
chief craftsman in developing the importance of the Taney Court as a
factor in the evolvement of national policy. Swisher's treatment of that Court
during the eventful middle years of American history stands as a monument
in historical and political research.1
One of the many poignant suggestions for further inquiry into the
work of the high federal bench, which Swisher made to a political science
seminar at Hopkins, was the advisability of examining the dissenting opinion
in the Taney Court. Accordingly, the present Article is a long delayed effort
to follow that suggestion. In general, the analysis of dissenting opinions ap-
pears useful in gaining further insight into the work of the judiciary; and,
in particular, the examination of the dissent in the Taney Bench should
be helpful in understanding the burden thrust upon the Supreme Court as it
attempted to guide the destiny of a distraught and splintered people faced
with the insuperable moral questions arising out of the slavery issue.
PATTERN OF DISSENT
On March 28, 1836, Roger Brooke Taney of Maryland was sworn in
as the Chief Justice of the United States. His appointment to the Supreme
Court was to begin a momentous period in the history of the Nation's high-
est forum. On October 12, 1864, Chief Justice Taney passed away. Although
he died in office, he had ceased to play an active role in his Court after 1863.2
There were 20 justices who served on the Taney Court. Davis and Field,
2 of the 20, were appointed after Taney had ceased being active in the
work of the high bench. When Taney first came on the Court, its member-
ship was 7; in 1837 it was raised to 9. At the very close of his tenure, the
Court was increased briefly to 10. Only 1 of the Justices serving on the
Court when Taney was appointed remained on the Bench longer than he.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware; B.S., 1933, University
of Pennsylvania; M.A., 1936, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1950, Johns Hopkins
University. This study was made possible by a grant from the Summer Fellowship Com-
mittee of the University of Delaware.
1. See SwisHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1954)
SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935).
2. Id. at 574-78.
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There were 3 others sitting with him who served almost as long as the
Chief Justice. The mean tenure of the Justices on the Taney Court, excluding
Davis and Field, was a little over 13 years. The total years of service of all
the members was 242, and 7 Justices alone accounted for 137 years. These
7-Taney, McLean, McKinley, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, and Nelson-served
for more than 15 years each.
3
TABLE I*
























































































Although there is some evidence of general compatability among this
group of 7 Justices (which may in part be attributable to the fact that 6 of
them were appointed by either Jackson or Van Buren), the Taney Court
is not noted for unanimity of opinion. In the twenty-six years of Taney's
active chief-justiceship the Supreme Court was the center of controversies
which rocked the country. Much of this conflict concerned the position of the
states in the American governmental pattern. The Supreme Court faced its
greatest challenge during these years in the important area of federal-state
relations. Much of the difficulty in the federal arrangement arose from tie
fact of slavery and the bearing it had upon American political theory. More
significant to the development of constitutional law in the United States, how-
ever, were the questions confronting the Court in such matters as the legal
status of corporations, 4 state taxing power,5 state police power,0 admiralty
3. Id. at 589. See Table I infra.
4. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
5. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).

























jurisdiction,7 and control over interstate commerce.8 Of vital importance to
the function of the Court itself were decisions involving separation of
powers9 and the doctrine of judicial supremacy. 10
To a considerable extent the Supreme Court under Taney established
the basis for the operation of the American federal system. Not all of its
opinions are part of the law of the land today, but much of the jurisprudence
of our federal system traces its origin to the work of Taney and his brethren.
Taney's Court was largely concerned with "finding a workable adjustment
of the theoretical distribution of authority between two governments for a
single people."'" Of lasting significance to the development of federal-state
relations was the rule handed down in Swift v. Tyson,12 in which the concept
of a federal common law was developed. Even today, in spite of its over-
turn in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 13 the effect of the earlier decision is still felt.
The Eric decision has not been easy to follow, particularly if the state supreme
courts have not declared the common law of their states in particular areas
of litigation (by which declarations, under Erie, the federal courts are bound
in diversity cases) or if the state supreme courts change their minds as
to what the law of the state is. If the state courts have not spoken, then the
federal courts have to search for the common law of the state, and one
federal court could easily find differently from another in diversity cases
involving the same state common law; yet, by overruling Tyson an attempt
was made to develop uniformity of decision as far as the interpretation of
state common law is concerned. The hope is that this interpretation will rest
with the highest state court. Eric, however, has made it possible for litigants
in diversity cases to shop around and find state courts favorable to their
pleas. Diversity cases dealing with the same questions of law find different
answers depending upon the state in which the suit is brought; hence, Erie has
not helped in reaching national uniformity, which was the goal in Tyson.1
4
Conoley v. Board of Wardens5 (the Pilot Case) still continues to help
make the law of interstate commerce. New York v. Miln"' began the frame-
work for the definition of state police power. In spite of these great accom-
plishments, however, the Taney Court seemed continually beset by internal
7. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
8. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
9. Kendall v. United States, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 524 (1838).
10. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
11. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 73 (1937).
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. See Wells v. Sinionds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); PRITCIIETT, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 126 (1959).
15. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
16. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 109 (1837).
19641
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
conflict. Instead of this conflict diminishing as the Justices became better
acquainted, it grew. With the intensification of moral attack by one section
of the country upon the other as a result of the slavery question, the Court
suffered deeply. The cleavage began in Prigg v. Pennsylvania" and reached
its fullest with Dred Scott v. Sandford.'5
During the first half of Taney's tenure the dissent was largely single-
judge disagreement. It was the second period that brought forward the
strong dissidence which caused Mr. Justice Frankfurter to comment upon
"the frequency of close decision."' 9 After 1850 the pattern of dissent changed
from sporadic, isolated instances of individual judges entering minority
opinions20 based on some personal attitude regarding certain aspects of tile
law, such as Baldwin's refusal to accept the majority's view in land cases,
to one in which three or four judges took strong issue with the political
assumptions of the majority. " In many of these latter instances the majority
itself could come to no common agreement as to the reasons for their deci-
sion .22 Certainly after the Great Compromise any, semblance of approximate
unanimity disappeared. The second half of the Taney period was marked by
mounting conflict both outside and within the judicial process. Every deci-
sion after 1850 seemed somehow or other to be touched by the spectre of
slavery.23 It became increasingly difficult to judge any case on its legal merits
alone.
Out of 1,507 cases of issue heard in the Taney Court, 252, or slightly
over 16 per cent, contained dissent.24 Of these 252 cases, 135 were single-
judge dissents. Only in 18 instances was the Court divided with only a
majority of one. Slightly over 60 per cent of the single-judge dissents were
entered by 3 of the 18 Justices serving during all or part of the Taney period.
These Justices were Baldwin, McLean, and Daniel. Oddly enough, although
these three together made tip a large share of the dissent of the Court, only
once did any two of them agree on objecting (McLean and Baldwin) ; and
in no case did they dissent as a unit. In 150 of the 252 cases in which dissents
were filed, either McLean or Daniel or both were in the minority. Thus, these
two Justices accounted for much of the lack of unanimity that marked the
17. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
18. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
19. FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 72.
20. E.g., Heirs of Wilson v. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 140 (1838).
21. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
22. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
23. See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854).
24. See Table II, infra. There were 1,964 cases listed including 457 which were
not heard to conclusion or were postponed for further hearing. In all of the 1,964 cases
there were 304 dissents entered, but of these there were 51 which were in cases not




Taney Court. Mr. Justice Catron, who served almost the same number of
years as McLean and ten years longer than l)aniel was also a frequent dis-
senter. McLean, Catron, and Daniel collectively appeared in over 80 per cent
of the dissents although only once did all three of them dissent in the same
case.2
5
Daniel was the most frequent dissenter on the Taney Court. He was
in the minority in 88 cases out of 1,246. He was followed by McLean who
appeared in 63 dissents out of 1,499 cases. Catron was the next highest with
49 out of 1,503. Both Baldwin and Campbell had a higher percentage of dis-
THE INCIDENCE OF
TABLE II
DISSENT IN THE TANEY COURT
1837-1862
Number of Unanimous Total Number
Year Dissents Decisions of Cases
1837 4 15 19
1838 17 26 43
1839 7 39 46
1840 5 36 41
1841 3 28 31
1842 4 39 43
1843 3 26 29
1844 3 35 38
1845 12 38 50
1846 4 42 46
1847 5 30 35
1848 5 31 36
1849 10 31 41
1850 31 128 159
1851 13 75 88
1852 14 38 52
1853 15 65 80
1854 16 48 64
1855 19 70 89
1856 10 41 51
1857 11 61 72
1858 19 46 65
1859 9 105 114
1860 2 65 67
1861 6 61 67
1862 5 36 41
Totals 252 1255 1507
sents than these three leading dissenters, but appeared in a significantly
smaller nuJn)er of cases.-";
Under Taney. for the first time in the history of the Suprene Court,
disseilt becatie vocal. The writing of dissenting opinions, though not always
indulged in by the minority, probably forced the majority from time to time
25. Rundle v. I)elaware & Raritan Canal Co.. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852).




PARTICIPATION BY JUSTICES IN SINGLE AND PLURAL
1837-1862






























































































































to resort to lengthy and somewhat in-
effect upon the majority may account
in following the judicial reasoning of
defenses of its positions. 27 This
in part for the difficulty scholars have
the period because of the tendency of
each Justice in the majority to state his own point of view in answer to the
challenge to the Court's decision by those in dissent. Sometimes the dissent,
as in Dred Scott, made the majority say more than it needed to say, and
thus caused it to overstate its point of view.2 8 There were times when the
dissent showed how tenuously the decision of the Court had been reached as
reflected by the multiplicity of concurring opinions. 29
It is extremely difficult to discover any particular constellation of Justices
delivering the bulk of the dissent. No combinations such as the Holmes-
Brandeis-Stone grouping, the Douglas-Black team, or the Sutherland-Van
Devanter-Butler-McReynolds pattern appears in the Taney Court. The mass
of the dissenting opinion is single-judge opinion. Even though plural dissents
become much more evident after 1849, no combination of Justices ever ap-
pears as the strongly dissenting element in the Court. Of the several combi-
nations, ranging from two to four Justices in the minority, only one group
27. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
28. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 246 (2d ed. 1954).
29. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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TABLE IV
NUMBER OF DISSENTS IN THE TANEY COURT RELATED To NUMBER
OF JUDGES PARTICIPATING
1837-1862
Single-Judge Two-Judge Three-Judge Four-Judge
Year Dissents Dissents Dissents Dissents
1837 2 1 1 0
1838 14 0 3 0
1839 4 1 2 0
1840 2 2 1 0
1841 1 0 2 0
1842 3 1 0 0
1843 3 0 0 0
1844 3 0 0 0
1845 7 2 3 0
1846 1 3 1 0
1847 2 2 1 0
1848 2 3 0 0
1849 6 2 0 2
1850 12 2 10 7
1851 6 5 2 0
1852 5 4 4 1
1853 5 0 7 3
1854 10 4 1 1
1855 11 3 5 0
1856 5 3 2 0
1857 8 0 1 2
1858 13 2 4 0
1859 6 3 0 0
1860 1 0 1 0
1861 3 3 0 0
1862 0 2 1 2
Totals 135 48 52 18
(Catron, Daniel, and Campbell) entered common dissents in as many as
five cases.
QUESTIONS FACING THE COURT
In order to understand the pattern of dissent in the Taney Court it is
imperative to know the important questions it faced. The basic problem was
how to resolve the widening conflict between the opposing sections of the
country as to the use of state and federal power.
30 It will be remembered that
the Marshall Court had advanced the role of the federal government, holding
that the Constitution should be broadly interpreted as giving power to the
federal arm and as denying the states authority to gainsay that power.
3 1
30. 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS ch. 6 (1957); SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT 201 (2d ed. 1954).
31. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ; McCullough v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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The Taney Court did not rescind this effort, and in spite of mounting qualms
on the part of the Southern states'-righters, Taney himself extended the
concept of federal supremacy
2
Questions involving the commerce power also occupied much of the
Court's time." Although nothing like the extension of the commerce control
that took place during the 19 30's under the New Deal occurred under the
Taney decisions, a steady growth in the use of the federal power is discernible.
Development of business on a national level demanded governmental protec-
tion of commercial activities which the parochial state authorities would not
and probably could not provide. The expansion of business activity also
brought with it the increased use of the corporate form of business manage-
ment which gave rise to the question of what to do with the sticky matter of
corporate status when the corporate enterprise did business across state lines.
Commercial questions also were at the base of the problem of whether
or not to extend the federal admiralty power over shipping on inland waters.
Some of the most vituperative and sustained dissents, though usually in a
decided minority, were uttered against the extension of the admiralty author-
ity.3 4 Closely aligned with the general subject of commercial protection by the
federal government was the question of how far to develop the general law
regarding patents and their administration. Although the question often
bumped along in the slough of judicial irresolution, gradual growth of the
patent law under the aegis of the federal courts can be detected during the
reign of the Taney Court.35 The increase in industrialization demanded the
protection of patent rights which only the federal government was in a posi-
tion to offer.
International questions involving such matters as the legitimacy of
Spanish and Mexican land grants,;" the authority of a state over foreign
extradition, 37 and the right of a state to interpret the terms of a treaty as
it affected domestic problems of the state" were seemingly constantly in
front of the Taney tribunal.
Also in the field of federal-state relations were questions involving the
power of the federal government over bankruptcy. 9 How far could a state
go in impairing contracts of a public nature ? Of increasing concern to state
32. See Ablernan v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
33. KELLEY & HARRISON, TIlE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 348 (1955).
34. See Rich v. South Carolina R.R., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 347 (1851); Newton v.
Stebbins, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 585 (1850).
35. See Channing v. Boston Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217 (1858).
36. Strather v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 .(1838) ; Levy v. Arredondo. 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 218 (1838); United States v. Mills' Heirs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 215 (1838).
37. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
38. Lessee of Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4 (1840).
39, Ex partc City Bank, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845).
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jurists was the alleged right of the federal judiciary to interpret state law
when either a federal question was involved 40 or diversity jurisdiction was
claimed.41 Persistent questions concerning the limit to federal judicial power,
4
-
the responsibility of federal officers in tort,43 and the law regulating interstate
compacts 44 plagued the Court from time to time, but they did not raise con-
trolling issues. Of lesser note but of great concern to the states involved was
the power of the federal government through its judiciary to determine con-
flicts over state boundaries. 45 All these matters formed the jurisdictional
framework within which the Taney Court made the law against which was
fashioned the pattern of dissent, with which this Article is concerned.
MAIN AREAS OF CONFLICT IN THE OPINIONS
Considering first the quantum of dissent, we note three basic areas of
conflict among the Justices. They are: (1) the adjudication of land grants;
(2) the authority of the federal government over state judicial action vis-
a-vis corporations; and (3) the right of the federal judiciary to interpret
state law.
46
With regard to land grants the three most frequent dissenters-Daniel,
McLean, and Catron-were often joined by Mr. Justice Wayne. In the
second area regarding the corporate status and the jurisdiction over cor-
porations trading across state lines, Catron refused to recognize corporations
for purpose of diversity jurisdiction.47 Daniel and Nelson, although not going
to the lengths to which Catron reverted in terms of denouncing the whole
theory of corporate entity for purposes of suit,48 were loath to set aside state
jurisdiction.49 Eventually, Catron and Nelson linked the question of states'
rights with that of the right of a state to have sole jurisdiction over corpora-
tions doing business within its borders.50 This joinder resulted in both
Justices usually dissenting whenever the Court permitted a corporation the
right to sue in the federal courts.5 '
With respect to the right of the federal judiciary to place its own
40. See Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464 (1845).
41. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
42. E.g., Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436 (1839).
43. E.g., Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839).
44. E.g., Morlatt v. Silk, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 1 (1837).
45. E.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
46. 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 30, chs. 3, 6.
47. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 337 (1853) (dissent-
ing opinion).
48. Northern Ind. R.R. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 233, 247
(1853) (dissenting opinion).
49. See, e.g., Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 550 (1850) (dissenting
opinion).
50. 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 30, at 515-16.
51. Id. at 516.
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interpretation upon state law, Taney, insistent upon maintaining the right of
each to determine the law properly within its jurisdiction, usually concurred
with Catron and Daniel against the majority view.5 2 Mr. Justice Nelson
sometimes was aligned with this trio.
53
The variety of the types of cases confronting the Taney Court was
such that no single group of Justices ever combined as a unit in dissent in
any appreciable number of cases. What occurred was that in respect of specific
questions such as whether the admiralty jurisdiction extended to contracts
of marine insurance on inland waters, Daniel or sometimes Catron would
dissent, to be joined by one or more other Justices whose dissents would not
be on the same grounds as that of any other.5 4 Even in cases involving corpora-
tions Daniel and Catron were frequently not together,5 5 but between the two
of them the bulk of the dissent in corporate cases was to be found.
NATURE OF THE DISSENT
It is important to note a decided difference in the number and kind
of cases coming before the Court during its early period ending in 1849 and
those decided in the period 1850-1864. The leading dissenter in the early
period was Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania, who had been appointed by
Jackson in 1830. Mr. Justice Baldwin accounted for 16 of the 50 single-judge
dissents between 1837 and 1849. He was in the minority of 5 other cases
along with others. Baldwin's dissents (14 of which appeared in 1838 alone)
reflect a belief that the Constitution should be interpreted in terms of the
common law ;56 hence, he dissented whenever he felt that the Constitution was
being used to uphold either state or federal government in respect to the
other. He viewed the Supreme Court as arbiter in disputes between states
over such matters as boundaries, but he did not believe the Constitution gave
one competency or the right to act against the other 57 As to the power to act,
Baldwin looked to the common law for the definition of a constitutional state-
ment.58 He served until 1844, but during the latter years his mind seems to
have slipped.59
52. E.g., Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 623, 632 (1853) (dissenting
opinion).
53. E.g., Clements v. Berry, 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 398, 412 (1850) (dissenting
opinion).
54. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307, 322 (1857).
55. E.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 337, 338 (1853)
(dissenting opinions).
56. See BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1837), also found in 9 Sup. Ct. Reps.
(Law. ed.) 869-969 (1837).
57. Id. at 885.
58. Id. at 875-76.
59. 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 277 (1847).
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In addition to Baldwin's lone dissents three other Justices (McLean,
Catron, and Daniel) entered 22 single objections during the early period of
the Taney Court. These three Justices opposed interference with what they
considered the sovereign right of a state to abrogate contracts in the public
area.60 Although McLean had disagreed with the majority in Proprietors oj
the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge,61 his dissent in
Bronson v. Kinzie,62 in which case an Illinois statute establishing a moratorium
on execution of foreclosed mortgages was declared invalid as an impairment of
contract, was an indication of his attitude in respect of a state's authority.
McLean came more and more to believe, especially as the slavery question
grew and his own political aspirations increased, that a state had the right
to protect its public order 63 and that the abrogation of property rights might
be necessary to this end. In McLean's mind the state could be limited in the
exercise of its police power only if it breached a valid federal law or if the
subject matter was strictly federal. In Fox v. Ohio,64 for example, he differed
from the finding that Ohio could pass a law punishing counterfeiting, claim-
ing the state law interfered with the power given to the federal government
by the Constitution. McLean's dissents during the early period of the Taney
Court ran the gamut from upholding state power over the treaty olligations
concerning land grants 65 to questioning the exclusiveness of the federal au-
thority in the administration of patents.6 6 The pattern of his early dissents is
hard to discern. They tend to be of a somewhat obscure and contradictory
nature and do not fully indicate the development of his later view that the
basic role of the Supreme Court was to define the limits of both state and
federal power.6 7 To the layman, McLean's opinions may appear overly tech-
nical6" and may cause one to suspect they hide a much deeper drive than that
motivated by a desire to develop a doctrine of constitutional restraint. McLean
was a politician first and foremost, and his judicial opinions must always be
viewed in light of his ambition to be President.
John Catron, a Democrat from Tennessee, was appointed to the Court
by Jackson in 1837.69 He had served for an extended period on the high
60. See, e.g., Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 93
(1852) (dissenting opinions).
61. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 554 (1837).
62. 42 U.S. (I How.) 311, 322 (1843) (dissenting opinion).
63. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 658 (1842).
64. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 411 (1847). Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
65. Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 451 (1839) (dissenting opinion).
66. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 688 (1846) (dissenting opinion).
67. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN McLEAN 169 (1937).
68. See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 322 (1843) (dissenting
opinion).
69. SwIsHER, ROGER B. TANEY 426 (1935).
1964]
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bench in Tennessee and had become proficient in land law.70 His dissents,
unlike those of McLean, appear to follow a consistent pattern. Catron op-
posed federal intervention in matters of dispute involving land grants,
71
which he considered by their very nature to be within the jurisdiction of the
state. His knowledge of the law of real property brought him into dispute
with McLean, himself a former land commissioner, in the interpretation of
treaties respecting conveyances of land by a state.72 Further, Catron generally
refused to authorize federal judicial action in matters involving corporations
suing under diversity of citizenship.75 But if the federal authority appeared to
him to be clearly granted by the Constitution over specific areas such as
navigable waters, he ruled against the state.7 4 Catron's first dissent was
uttered in the celebrated case of Kendall v. United States75 where he joined
with Taney and Barbour in the view that the court of appeals did not possess
the common law power to issue a mandamus to the Postmaster General
compelling him to make payments of certain allowances to contractors whose
rights to these allowances were questioned. Catron was loath to let the
federal authority use the common law for the enforcement of its powers, con-
tending that the federal government must find its implements within the
specific clauses of the Constitution. 6 In this respect his reasoning was
markedly different from that of Baldwin. Under this principle Catron issued
his notable dissent in Swift v. Tyson,77 in which case the Court had recognized
the existence of a federal common law.
In his insistence that the federal government's jurisdiction be limited
strictly by the Constitution, Catron had a close ally in Peter V. Daniel of
Virginia. Mr. Justice Daniel, appointed by Van Buren in 1841, was the ex-
treme states'-righter of the Taney Court.78 Daniel entered into no dissents
until 1844. Between 1844 and 1849 he made 13, 6 of which were single-judge
dissents. During this period he was closely matched by McLean, although he
did not once object along with the latter. It was during this early period of
the Taney Court that Daniel began his long series of dissents, which was
based primarily upon his assumption that the Constitution clearly prevented
70. III DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 576 (1929).
71. Clements v. Berry, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 398, 412 (1850) (dissenting opinion).
72. E.g., Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 366, 427 (1840)
Lessee of Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4, 17 (1840).
73. E.g., Mechanics' Bank v. Debolt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 380, 383 (1855).
74. E.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845) (dissenting opinion).
In Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 426, 437 (1845) Mr. Justice Catron dissented,
arguing that state courts were without jurisdiction over bankruptcy.
75. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 626 (1838).
76. Swift V. Tyson, 57 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 23 (1842).
77. Ibid.
78. V DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 69 (1930).
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a confusion of the separate jurisdictions of the federal and state competencies."0
In general, Daniel contended that, unless clearly prohibited by the Constitu-
tion, a state was almost sovereign in the exercise of its authority. s0 His early
dissents are replete with vigorous defenses of the states' rights over roads and
waterways. In the troublesome litigation over the status of the Cumberland
Road, Daniel's view was that the federal government had no authority to
construct roads within or between states.8' His commitment to the doctrine
of states' rights was to place him often in the minority largely because he
insisted upon applying it in any instance where an attempt was made to
employ federal power to guard the people against the authority of their
own state governments. As the economy expanded, the federal government
perforce came to be more and more involved in diversity litigation especially
with the rise in the number of corporations doing business across state lines.
Daniel objected strenuously to the protection given to corporations "as citi-
zens" under the federal judicial process.82 In line with his contention that the
federal jurisdiction should be severely limited, he objected to the application
of maritime law to civil actions occurring on inland waterways within a
state.83 His first of a long series of dissents in admiralty cases was entered
in New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank8 4 in which he and Catron
thought that the federal circuit court had no jurisdiction in admiralty over
questions involving marine contracts. His opinions concerning the limitation
of admiralty jurisdiction never became the law of the land, but his consistency
in objecting to the extension of the admiralty power showed a tenacity of
purpose for keeping the American federal system as one of confederated
sovereignties with as little power as possible vesting in the federal authority.
In the interpretation of state law by a federal court, Daniel insisted that the
rulings of the state's highest court must serve as the basis for the federal
decision.8 5 He feared nothing more than the advancement of federal power.
In a rather sharp dissent in the Passenger Cases8 6 he contended that the state's
attempt to tax immigration was a val*id exercise of its police power. In many
ways Daniel was like Baldwin in his strict construction of the Constitution,
yet he was quite forthright in his opinions, whereas the latter did not write
79. See, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532 (1848).
80. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 268, 278 (1852)
(dissenting opinion).
81. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180 (1845) (dissenting opinion).
82. See SwIsHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 226 (2d ed. 1954).
83. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 467-503 (1847) (dissenting opinion).
84. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848).
85. Erwin v. Lowry, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 172, 184 (1849); Rowan v. Runnels, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 134, 140 (1847) (dissenting opinion). Cf. Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 589 (1856) where Mr. Justice Daniel agreed with the majority that federal courts
could decide on the merits if a conflict existed in the state's decisions.
86. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 494 (1849).
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dissents. Daniel took great pains to make clear his objections to the majority
view. He had a fine literary style, and his reasoning, while at times involved,
is cogent. As the Compromise of 1850 opened the gates for an onrush of the
controversy over slavery and with it the dislocation of the delicate balance
between the powers of the states and those of the federal government, Daniel
became even more alarmed. As the great issue continued to plague the Court,
Daniel found himself engaged along with Taney, Grier, Catron, and Campbell
in a fruitless search for a formula that would preserve the states within the
Union.87
The dissent in the period between 1837 and 1849 was entered mostly
by individual judges with Baldwin, McLean, Catron, and Daniel rendering
the bulk of the objections. Although ranging over a wide area of litigation,
the dissent seemed to focus upon two questions: What was the power
of the federal government over activities occurring within the states such as
the building of roads ?88 To what extent could a state exercise its police
power?so Although these matters were important to the development of
American constitutional law, they did not result in deep-seated controversy
among the Justices nor did they rouse the interest of the public in the work
of the Court. It was not until the Court had to face the great question of
whether a federal system could turn aside the thrust of the forces arising
out of the moral and economic aspects of the slavery problem that the dis-
agreement among them assumed proportions of vital import to the con-
tinuance of that system.
The pattern of dissent in the Taney Court changed perceptibly in 1850.
The change was twofold. First, although the percentage of dissents remained
about the same (16.6 in the period 1837-1849 and 16.8 in the period 1850-
1862), the absolute number more than doubled, rising from 83 to 170. Also,
the number of dissents in which two or more judges joined increased from 33
in the earlier period to 85 in the later period. Second, and perhaps more
significant, was the fact that the nature of the dissent in the later period
became increasingly more complex than it had been earlier.90 The slavery
question had begun to overshadow litigation in other areas tinging them with
the color of the growing sectional struggle and confusing many purely legal
questions with strong value of judgments concerning the power of the state
vis-a-vis the federal government. Added to the technical objections which
were continued by Catron and Daniel in such matters as the extension of
87. See, e.g., Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 623 (1853).
88. See, e.g., Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 721 (1845).
89. See, e.g., Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841); New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
90. SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 488-89
(1963).
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the admiralty jurisdiction to inland waters9" and the adjudication of land
grants,92 there was a mounting series of decisions involving interstate trans-
portation,9 3 corporations doing business interstate,9 4 extension of federal
equity jurisdiction,95 and the relationship of treaties to state law. 96 With in-
creasing severity the Court seemed to be handling more and more issues
which in a former time either were not litigated or were decided by state
tribunals. Interspersed among the welter of decisions in the areas involving
federal-state relations was a group of cases having to do with the age-old
question of impairment of contract by a state. Justices Wayne and McLean
took pains to point out that even though the ruling in the Charles River
Bridge97 case had become the guiding principle in matters where public im-
provement called for extinguishing previously granted charter rights, some
restraints had to be levelled against arbitrary state action. 98 On the other
hand, when rescission of a charter was held to be an impairment of contract
in cases involving public utilities, Catron and Daniel, abetted by Taney, dis-
sented, reasoning that a college was in effect a public corporation and that
the state legislature could rescind the charter. 99
Probably the most celebrated brace of cases involving impairment of
contract during the Taney period were Bank of Ohio v. Knoup100 and Ohio
Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt.10 1 In the latter case the majority, with Taney writing
the opinion, varied so greatly that the reporter announced there was "no
opinion of the Court as such."'1 °2 Taney held that when an incorporation
was made by a state, the incorporators had to see that the language of the
charter granting an exemption from increase in taxes was clear and un-
equivocal ;103 if it were not, then the interpretation placed upon the charter
by the highest court of the state of incorporation was constitutional and did
not serve as an impairment of contract if it upheld the state tax power. The
states'-righters, Catron and Daniel, agreed that the state could not bind
itself in matters of this kind.10 4 Justices Curtis, Wayne, and Nelson dissented,
91. See The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 463 (1851).
92. See Lessee of Brown v. Clements, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 650, 667 (1845).
93. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
94. Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. Darby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468 (1852).
95. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
96. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
97. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
98. E.g., Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Louisa R.R., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 71, 83 (1851)
(dissenting opinion).
99. Board of Trustees v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 268, 278 (1852).
100. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
101. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853).
102. 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 372 (1957).
103. 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 435.
104. Id. at 443.
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with Curtis reasoning that the rate of tax could not be different from that
imposed on other banking institutions whose charters contained specific and
unequivocal exemptions.10 5 In Bank of Ohio v. Knoup,106 however, Taney
agreed with McLean that a statute which attempted to rescind a contract en-
tered into by a state granting a set-off to the state in lieu of taxes was uncon-
stitutional.107 Catron, Daniel, and Campbell believed that a state could not
under any circumstances enter into such a binding contract and that no part
of a state's sovereign capacity to tax could be surrendered by a corporate
charter being issued.' 08 Catron contended that one legislature could not bind
its successors. 109
More than the matter of impairment of contract, however, was involved
in this type of controversy. Basic to such cases was the greater question of
federal-state relations, namely, whether or not the federal courts could inter-
vene in what was considered by the minority to be the state's power to control
all actions of an economic nature occurring within its borders. To Daniel,
Catron, and Campbell any interference with the internal affairs of the state
could not be justified on the basis of impairment of contract. No state could
ever surrender the vital power to provide for its people by relinquishing its
ability to exact revenue, 1 0 and no state could be denied the right to protect
the property of its citizens. The larger question also concerned the right of
a state to decide exclusively the social aspects of its society. Included in such
reasoning was the idea that the use of the state police power should be free
from interference by the federal government."' The use of such power over
slavery, for example, should be made secure. Somehow the control over cor-
porations, the right to tax, the diminution of the power of the federal courts
in diversity jurisdiction, the resistance to federal intervention in interstate
boundary disputes, and the opposition by states to the federal court's adjudi-
cation of land grants effecting real property within a state were all connected
with the right to property in slaves. 1 2 It was the Southerners' fear of federal
intervention in slavery that drove them to gain control of the central
105. Id. at 450.
106. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
107. Id. at 393.
108. Id. at 415.
109. Id. at 405.
110. Part of the pattern of dissent involving state sovereignty can be discerned in
Campbell's dissenting opinion in Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854)
where he objected to the majority view that in a boundary dispute between two states
the Attorney General of the United States could intervene, but that the United States
could not become a party to the suit. The dissent contended that unless a third party
was involved in the suit, it could not intervene either under common law or in equity;
hence, the federal authority could not be brought to bear on the states in such instances.
Id. at 514. Justices Daniel, McLean, and Curtis also dissented.
111. See Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
112. See 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 102, ch. 6.
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government in order to insure that it would not be used against their
"peculiar institution." 1 3 From this point they moved to guarantee the right
of a slave owner to his property even when he took this property into states
and territories where the public consensus was against slavery.
Closely aligned with the theory of states' rights vis-A-vis the slave ques-
tion was the idea of exclusive police power of a state. This concept had its
influence on the whole development of the dissent in the latter period of the
Taney Court. Catron and Daniel led the defense of the state police power in
wide-ranging opinions covering the gamut of questions arising from control
over corporations,1 14 control over inland waterways,11 5 federal authority over
bridges spanning navigable streams,1 18 and federal jurisdiction over questions
involving the diversion of waters of a navigable stream by states.
117
Daniel focused his attack in Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co.'"
on the theory that a corporation was a citizen for purposes of establishing
diversity jurisdiction. He deplored the idea that a corporation, merely because
it was incorporated i i another state, could sue in a federal court those persons
resident in the state in which it was doing business, thus circumventing the
jurisdiction of state courts completely. To him this theory was plainly con-
trary to the meaning of the Constitution as to the nature of and reasons for
the provision regarding diversity jurisdiction, and if persisted in would
render state control over economic activities nonexistent. n 9 Although Louis-
ville R.R. v. Letson,120 had held that a corporation was a citizen, for purposes
of suing and being sued, Daniel, who did not sit in that case, refused in the
Rundle case to hold himself "trammelled" by the Letson precedent. He
reasoned that such ruling both repudiated the doctrines of the Roman lawyers
as to what constituted a "subject" and a "citizen," and "repealed, at the same
time, that restriction in the Constitution which limited the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States to controversies between 'citizens of different
states.' "121 Daniel stood alone in this extreme position, but it was later to
become the basis on which he built his argument that the Court could not
recognize as "citizens" (e.g., corporations and slaves) those which the Con-
113. COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 52 (1934).
114. E.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 337, 338 (1853)
(dissenting opinions).
115. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.), 443, 463 (1851) (dissent-
ing opinion).
116. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 517, 593, 627
(1851) (dissenting opinions.)
117. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 95 (1852)
(dissenting opinions).
118. Id. at 96.
119. Id. at 96-102.
120. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
121. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 100 (1852).
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stitution did not contemplate as citizens. Inasmuch as corporations, though
"judicial persons," were not to be considered as "citizens," slaves could not
be so considered. From this restricted definition of citizenship he was able to
exclude slaves from that class of persons who could sue and be sued, and
thus stated in Dred Scott v. Sandford122 that a slave could have no rights
not granted by a state.
There is some indication that the dissenting Justices in Rundle, par-
ticularly Daniel, felt that the encroachments upon state sovereignty were made
more by the federal judiciary than by the Congress.1 23 It may be that the
diffuse dissent in the cases involving corporations should be attributed to
the fact that the majority of the Justices sensed the need to make federalism
work in spite of the tendency at that stage in our history to view the states
as sovereign. The shifts in the majority view and the intensity of the dissent-
ing opinions in these cases indicate an awareness on the part of the Court
of the immensity of the problem and the need for reaching a modus operandi
for maintaining the federal system. The social needs which required solution
as the United States expanded and became more complex forced the Court
to reconcile the pressures reflected on the one hand by fast developing nation-
alism and on the other by the inability of the states to control matters which
had begun to transcend their boundaries and capacities. 124 The problem of
slavery, however, seemed incapable of being fitted into any pattern of recon-
ciliation.
The impact of the slavery question upon the law of the land was not
felt by the Taney Court until 1841. In that year in the case of Groves v.
Slaughter125 the issue of slavery and states' rights was joined. The Court
held that a constitutional provision of Mississippi forbidding the importation
of slaves into the state for sale was unconstitutional. In its several opinions
the Court avoided direct statement as to which jurisdiction, state or federal,
had the right to regulate slavery. The primary question before the Court was
whether or not the Mississippi prohibition was an interference with interstate
commerce. The Court avoided answering this question also by ruling that
no enforcement legislation had been enacted; hence, the prohibition was not
effective. x26 Justices McKinley and Story disagreed on the ground that the
state constitutional provision was enforceable on its face. 127 McLean, while
not technically in dissent, disagreed with the majority opinion. He was
motivated, perhaps, by the opportunity to further his political ambitions in
122. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 469 (1856) (concurring opinion).
123. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 90.
124. McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459 (1935).
125. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
126. Id. at 503.
127. See id. at 517.
[Vol. 68
TANEY-CO URT DISSENT
the North by declaring in favor of Mississippi's attempt to control the im-
portation of slaves. To him the power over slavery belonged to the states.1
28
Here McLean, perhaps unwittingly, laid the basis for the concept that
slavery existed only by municipal law; hence, Congress could not acknowledge
its existence in any place where the local law did not recognize it. Federal
fugitive slave laws by this dictum would appear to be in question as to their
constitutionality, for under his theory once a slave reached free territory he
ceased to be a slave.129 Slavery was a matter for regulation under the police
power of the states; the exercise of it was "a right higher and deeper than
the Constitution."130 Of more serious moment was the question of whether or
not McLean implied that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.
Did McLean also feel that Congress could not under any theory of its powers
interfere with slavery in the states? There is no opinion in the entire period
of the Taney Court that created more confusion or more illusion as to what
the law was regarding slavery than did this concurring opinion of McLean.
In the next year in Prigg v. Pennsylvania'3 ' the Court held that the
federal government had exclusive control over fugitive slaves and that the act
of Pennsylvania3 2 preventing removal of escaped slaves taken forcibly in
that state was unconstitutional. McLean wrote a separate opinion,"3 which
again while technically not in dissent, widely digressed from the majority view
written by Story. McLean contended that a state had a right to protect its
public order against arbitrary seizure of "persons"'1 4 but held with the Court
that the federal Fugitive Slave Act"35 was constitutional. Justices Daniel and
Catron, in spite of their insistence on states' rights, also sided with the Court.
Daniel, however, opposed the view that the states had no authority over
fugitive slaves, contending that they possessed concurrent jurisdiction. As to
Pennsylvania's right to prevent the return of the fugitives, Daniel was sin-
gularly silent. Apparently where slavery was involved neither Catron nor
Daniel was willing to extend his defense of state sovereignty if it meant in-
terference with the South's "peculiar institution.""1s6
128. Id. at 508.
129. Mr. Justice McLean, however, did concur in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1859), which decided that a state could not nullify the federal Fugitive
Slave Act.
130. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 508.
131. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
132. Pa. Laws 1826, ch. 150.
133. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 658.
134. Id. at 672.
135. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
136. In Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847) which came from
Mississippi, Daniel dissented from the majority holding that prohibition of the importa-
tion of slaves by a state was unconstitutional. For a discussion of this case in light of
the Groves case, see SWISHER, RoGER B. TANEY 419 (1935).
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With the enactment of the new fugitive slave law in 1850137 a new crop
of cases involving punishments for abetting the escape of slaves arose. In
Moore v. Illinois,138 the Court held that under the doctrine of dual sovereignty
the same person could be convicted under a state fugitive slave act as well as
under the federal statute. McLean dissented, reasoning that this duality
constituted double jeopardy ;139 yet, he had implied in the Groves dicta that
Congress had no power over slavery, its maintenance being subject solely
to municipal, or state law. Apparently, he, like Daniel, adopted the course of
inconsistency when the question of slavery was involved.
Although the issue of slavery was imminent in each of the cases just
discussed, it never reached the point of exploding the Court until Dred Scott
v. Sandford.140 The history of this decision has been mulled over to the point
that it has become a judicial legend. Many of the scholars writing about
this case have dwelled upon the dissent contending that it was the factor
causing the explosion, and it is a fact that the Northern press used the dis-
senting opinions to stir up sentiment against both the Court and the South.1
4 1
The abolitionists were abetted in their efforts by reaction to Taney's argu-
ment that a Negro "had no rights which a white man was bound to respect."'
142
It has been said that it was this statement that helped to set the powder train
leading to the Civil War ;143 yet, the dissent in Dred Scott had been long in
the making. There had been a constant questioning of what the judicial status
of slavery really was, and it was the attempt to answer this that really caused
Taney to issue his lengthy and unfortunate dicta. 44 Undoubtedly, McLean
welcomed the opportunity to make a strong statement against slavery as
this would enhance his chances for the presidential nomination.
The origins of the dissent in Dred Scott can be traced to McLean's
opinion in Groves v. Slaughter,145 in which he had argued that slavery could
exist only as a matter of state law; hence, if Scott had been taken into a
free state, he was free. Missouri, however, had decreed that Scott was a
slave under Missouri law. Inasmuch as he had returned to Missouri it would
seem that the decision in Strader v. Graham1.46 was controlling. In that case
two Negro musicians who had been sent by their master into a free state
137. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
138. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
139. Id. at 21.
140. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
141. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 251 (2d ed. 1954).
142. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
143. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 251 (2d ed. 1954).
144. Swisher, Dred Scott One IHundred Years After, 19 J. OF POLITICS 167, 170
(1957).
145. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
146. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
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to develop their talents had returned to their home state and later had
escaped to Canada. The owner sued those instrumental in the escape, the
defendants contended the Negroes were "free" because of their earlier
sojourn in a free state, but the Supreme Court denied this contention and
held for the owner, ruling that the domestic law of the state of domicile
decided their status. Scott, however, had come under the ownership of
Sandford, a citizen of New York; hence, suit was brought in a federal court
under the diversity doctrine on the theory that Scott was a "citizen" of
Missouri. The Supreme Court held that a federal court was not available,
because Scott was not under Missouri law a citizen of that state, but a
slave.147 The case could have been decided on this point alone, but Taney
wanted to decide once and for all the confused law on slaves and their
movement among the states and territories. The fact that the majority of
the Court was aware that both Justices McLean and Curtis would argue that
the Missouri Compromise was valid and therefore Scott, by having removed
to Illinois and to free Northern territory, was free, was also a controlling
factor in the decision. The majority wished to end the confusion as to
whether the Missouri Compromise was constitutional and to settle the ques-
tion of the federal authority over slavery. Accordingly, it was decided to
open up the case to full discussion of these very controversial points. 148
After several delays the Court re-argued the case and rendered its decision.
Scott had no standing to sue under diversity jurisdiction in a federal court
because he was not a citizen. 49 Further, Congress had no power to make
municipal law, which was the only law capable of making a slave a citizen;
hence, the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.
To the opinion of Taney and the decision of the Court, McLean and
Curtis objected. McLean set forth almost a complete denial of the several
findings at law which had led Taney and the majority to rule against Scott.
McLean argued that slavery in Illinois had been abolished by its municipal
law and that Congress had abolished it in the territories north of the Missouri
Compromise line.'
50
Curtis, the other dissenting Justice, refused to accept the majority's view
that Negroes had never been citizens of the United States and could not be.'
51
As to the right of the Congress to regulate slavery in the territories he cited
the Northwest Ordinance and the fact that the Constitution expressly stated
that the Congress could make rules governing territories.152 He referred to
147. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 413 (1852).
148. SWISHER, RoGER B. TANEY 504 (1935).
149. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404.
150. Id. at 554-55.
151. See id. at 601.
152. Id. at 613.
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history to prove his contention that from time to time free Negroes had
been given rights of citizens, certainly to the point that they could sue. He
agreed with McLean that Scott's sojourn in the Territory of Wisconsin had
made him free. 153 The minority opinions of McLean and Curtis became the
propaganda of the Republican Party, and through its widespread distribution
roused the more emotional anti-slavery elements. As a result of the Dred Scott
decision the Court lost the confidence of many of the Northerners,'154 and
with that loss went the opportunity for it to remain potent in the face of the
rising conflict. The effect of this failure has been felt for over a century.
THE DISSENT AFTER DRED SCOTT
There were few important dissents in the Taney Court after Dred Scott.
Most of the disagreement was routine. Daniel continued to take issue with
majority's extension of admiralty jurisdiction to the inland waters. 155 Catron
still questioned federal control over navigable waters totally within a state
under the theory that they came within the commerce power. 156 The usual
spate of land grant cases kept coming in front of the Court, and Daniel con-
tinued to object to the power of the federal judiciary over them. 157 He
also refused to recognize a corporation as a citizen within the meaning of
the Constitution for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, losing none of his
vehemence against this form of business organization in spite of its growing
acceptance. 158 McLean still refused to accept the rulings of a highest state
court contending that it did not have to be followed by the Supreme Court
of the United States if the state law seemed unsettled. 59 He was to be joined
in this by one of the later appointments to the Taney Court, Nathan Clifford
of Maine.
Clifford, a former Attorney General of the United States, was named by
Buchanan in 1858. His confirmation by the Senate was close because his
association with pro-slavery interests was resented by Northern senators.' 60
Clifford dissented 10 times in slightly over 300 cases in which he participated
between 1858 and 1863. He became involved in several land grant cases and
argued along with McLean that state court decisions in such cases did not
153. Id. at 601.
154. 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 102, at 424.
155. Brittan v. Barnaby, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 527, 538 (1858) (dissenting opinion)
Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307 (1857) (dissenting opinion).
156. Moore v. American Trans. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1, 39 (1860) (dissenting
opinion).
157. E.g., Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 274 (1857) (dissenting
opinion).
158. See Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227, 234
(1857) (dissenting opinion).
159. Lytle v. Arkansas, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 193, 207 (1859) (dissenting opinion).
160. IV DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 216-17 (1930).
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have to be followed if the grants could be considered in light of a treaty. 161
Joining Justices Nelson and Wayne in a dissent in the case of a bridge over
the Mississippi, Clifford agreed with Nelson that the federal authority had
full jurisdiction to the exclusion of the states.1 62 Clifford also joined Nelson,
Taney, and Catron in refusing to follow the majority view in the Prize Cases
that the President had the right to blockade ports in possession of those in
armed rebellion against the United States. 163 The dissent contended that the
President had no power on his own to institute a blockade of the Confederacy
until Congress recognized a state of war.' 6 4 Nelson, who wrote the dissent,
refused to recognize any power in the President to declare that a state of war
existed between the Government and the Southern states; hence, the Presi-
dent could not establish the blockade. 6 5 Such limitations would have seriously
curtailed the eventual development of the presidential power in relation to
the defense of the country if they had prevailed.
With the coming of the Civil War the case load of the Taney Court
dropped perceptibly. Such litigation as did reach the tribunal was of little
significance in the development of constitutional principles. Dissent was at
a minimum. Slightly less than 8 per cent of the cases heard during the last
three years of Taney's service on the high court contained dissenting views.
As the war years rolled on, the Court faded in face of the pre-emption of the
governmental scene by the President and the Congress. Whatever place the
dissent in the Taney Court was to hold in the development of American
jurisprudence had already been determined. The great dissenters-Daniel
and McLean-were gone from the Court. Daniel died in 1860, and McLean
in 1861. Catron, the third highest in the rank of the objectors, was soon to
go. He died in 1865. The contention of Daniel and Catron that the states
were equal to the federal government in terms of relative impingement of
powers, one upon the other, was soon to be denied by the arbitrament of arms.
McLean had never gained the political goals his heart desired in terms of at-
taining office, but his dissent in Dred Scott had helped set the stage for the
defeat of the states'-righters by lending the anti-slavery forces a semblance of
legality to buttress their sense of moral rightness in the "irrepressible
conflict."1
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161. United States v. Sutter, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 170, 183 (1858) (dissenting
opinion).
162. Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 496 (1862) (dissent-
ing opinion).
163. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 698 (1863).
164. Id. at 697.
165. Id. at 698-99.




No more provocative dissenting opinion than that of McLean in Dred
Scott has ever been uttered by the Supreme Court, but in the overall, the
dissent in the Taney Court seems not to have reached the stature of the
dissenting opinion in other courts in other times. There is lacking the
majesty and prescience of the Holmes-Brandeis rebuttal. The strong trumpet
sounds of Justices Douglas and Black are missing. Even the carefully reasoned
and sustained although anachronistic view presented by Mr. Justice Roberts
in his often lone battle against the Roosevelt majority is absent. The dissent
in the Taney Court gives the appearance of having been based at best on
crumbling rock.
What was the significance of the dissent in the Taney Court in terms
of the course of the law? Did it point to a trend indicating important changes
and new concept of rightness as the Nation developed into a complex society,
or was it a mere reflection of the confusion and perplexity of the times? Did
it strive to point up the need for a public consensus in spite of the diverse
political values held by a people caught in the throes of a great social and
economic revolution? The bulk of the dissent was of that technical kind
necessary to a judiciary that was still struggling for working principles. The
Marshall Court, busy as it was with "creating a nation" and "expounding a
Constitution ,' 167 had not by any means completed the groundwork for a viable
federalism nor had it fashioned the rules covering such procedural problems
of how to administer patent rights, depict the proper relationship of the
judicial and the political branches of government, apply admiralty process,
or set the framework within which the growing welter of corporation cases
involving diversity jurisdiction could be adjudicated. All of these issues
somehow seemed subordinated, however, to the great problem facing the Taney
Court, namely, how was the federal system to handle the question of slavery.
As mid-century was reached this problem seemed to overshadow the entire
operation of the Supreme Court. After the Compromise of 1850 had set the
two sections of the country clearly apart and in fact had readied the field for
battle, the Court was increasingly unable to apply itself to the constitutional
questions concerning the proper limits of state and federal power in the en-
forcement of diverging social values, held by the Southern states on the one
hand, and the rest of the Nation on the other. Dred Scott was the climax in
this growing incapacity, and with this decision the Court seemed to dis-
integrate.
In Dred Scott the Court had tried to come to grips with some of the
broad value questions confronting the Nation, but it failed to resolve them.
167. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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That it did not may rest in part with the difficulty for a judiciary of deciding
matters that are best handled by political rather than judicial decision.
168
It would seem that even if the majority of the Court could not have hit
upon a modus vivendi, by which the divergent values concerning states' rights
and federal power could have been reconciled, an articulate dissent at least
would have pointed up the need for such and would have warned of the
danger if a solution were not found. The dissent in the Taney Court did not,
however, form a core of opinion capable of depicting the inherent danger to
the operation of the federal system when confronted with a set of opposing
and countervailing social values. McLean, a Northerner, and Wayne, a
Southerner, both committed to an extension of the federal authority, could
have done much to sound the warning of the need to formulate a solution.
Curtis, a Whig, might have been led to join such a group. 169 Perhaps Taney
himself would have lent his weight to such a nucleus if these "spokesmen" of
divergent but not necessarily opposing interests had hit upon a moderate
approach to the vexing question of slavery. No group of Justices, however,
felt compelled to direct itself to find ways by which the federal process could
be made workable t , the mutual satisfaction of the contending political forces.
No effort to form a basic public consensus was forthcoming from any part
of the Court. If some attempt along these lines had been made, it might have
given the moderates some ground upon which to make a stand in the fight
to preserve the Nation without resorting to war. Instead, expediency and piece-
meal handling of cases reduced the judiciary to the depths of a stockjobbery
and denied the average citizen as well as the practicing politician a basis for
developing a workable solution to the slavery question, which presented the
most formidable challenge to federalism. If such an articulate dissent had
been forthcoming, it would have done much to point up the dangers and
pitfalls besetting certain courses of\action. By a frank and clear presentment
of the problems encountered in operating an increasingly complex society
under a federal arrangement, much probably could have been done to allay
the suspicion and distrust directed toward the Court during the fateful decade
of the 1850's. Instead of the indecisive and often biased thinking on a vast
range of problems involving federalism, there might have been formed a
body of judicial opinion exposing the consequences of overweening state
authority on the one hand and the uncritical extension of federal power on
the other. If this had been the aim of the dissent in the Taney Court, it
168. See Swisher, Dred Scott One Hundred Years After, 19 J. OF POLITICS 167,
168 (1957).
169. Although 2 HAINES & SHERWOOD, op. cit. supra note 102, at 513 states that
McLean, Wayne, and Curtis are the "strong federalists," these Justices concurred in-
frequently even when in the majority. When in the minority, they dissented as a unit
only 3 times.
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may well have been looked upon by present historians as the greatest exposi-
tion of statesmanship the Nation ever witnessed. The absence of a well-
defined dissent robbed the Court of what Professor Swisher has called the
greatest service that members of a judiciary can render a democracy-to
define a particular problem in terms of the sense of rightness of the times
and suggest feasible solutions. 170 Aided by this kind of dissent the Taney
Court might have found the formula for effective compromise and thus saved
the Nation the bloodbath from which it has not yet fully recovered.
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